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Abstract 
The transportation sector is associated with many negative externalities, including air pollution, 
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1.  Introduction 
The transportation sector is associated with many negative externalities, including air 
pollution, global climate change, and traffic congestion.  Vehicular emissions are an important 
source of air pollution and a major environmental concern in urban areas (Lin and Prince, 2009; 
Lin Lawell, 2017).  Motor vehicles are the primary source of carbon monoxide (CO), and an 
important source of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and nitrogen oxides (NOx, which consist 
of both nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2)) responsible for the formation of 
photochemical smog and ground-level ozone (O3). Vehicular emissions also contribute to the 
ambient air concentrations of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and particulate matter (PM10) (U.S. EPA, 1994).   
In addition to local air pollution, a second environmental concern to which the 
transportation sector contributes is global climate change.  The transportation sector is responsible 
for over a quarter of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (Auffhammer et al., 2016).  If annual 
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide continue unabated, global temperatures are estimated to rise 
about 2 degrees C in less than 40 years, with the potential of pushing the climate to a regime unlike 
any that has been witnessed in the last million years (Ramanathan et al., 2016).   
  A third externality arising in the transportation sector is traffic congestion.  Traffic 
congestion and long travel times are undesirable because they discourage future economic growth, 
increase vehicular emissions, increase fuel expenses, increase operating costs for both private and 
freight vehicles, decrease economies of agglomeration, heighten the psychological burden of 
travel, create a need for more emergency services, decrease the reliability of travel, and impose an 
opportunity cost on time (Morrison and Lin Lawell, 2016).  The external costs of congestion – 
which include increased operating costs for both private and freight vehicles, increased fuel usage 
and emissions, and, most significantly, the delay costs and uncertain travel times confronting 
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motorists – are substantial and have been steadily increasing (Beaudoin and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
Congestion can be particularly costly if individuals exhibit preferences for urgency owing to time 
constraints, schedule constraints, and possible penalties for being late (Bento, Roth and Waxman, 
2017).  
In this paper we discuss several possible policies for addressing the emissions and other 
environmental externalities from the transportation sector, including taxes, subsidies, mandates, 
restrictions, and investment.  Although most economists generally recommend that policy-makers 
use incentive- (or market-) based instruments as opposed to command and control policies 
whenever possible, various economic and political constraints can preclude policy instruments that 
would in theory achieve a first-best outcome from being employed, and policy-makers have often 
implemented alternative policies such as subsidies, mandates, restrictions, and/or investment 
instead.  Our discussion and analysis of these policies draws upon and synthesizes research using 
theoretical models, behavioral and experimental economics, empirical analyses, and structural 
econometric modeling.   
 
2. Taxes 
Most economists generally recommend that policy-makers use incentive- (or market-) 
based instruments as opposed to command and control policies whenever possible (Auffhammer 
et al., 2016; Lade, Lin Lawell and Smith, 2018a).  Whenever unpriced emissions are the sole 
market failure, incentive-based instruments such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program are 
more likely to achieve the social optimum and maximize social net benefits (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 
1960).   
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One incentive- (or market-) based instrument that many economists recommend for 
addressing the emissions and other environmental externalities from the transportation sector is a 
gasoline tax.  Gasoline consumption contributes to air pollution, global climate change, and traffic 
congestion, all of which are critical environmental issues. According to Mankiw (2006), higher 
gasoline taxes are “the most direct and least invasive policy to address environmental concerns”.  
As Stavins (2004) explains: “A gas tax increase – coupled with an offsetting reduction in other 
taxes, such as the Social Security tax on wages – could make most American households better 
off, while reducing oil imports (read dependence on Middle Eastern regimes), local pollution, 
urban congestion, road accidents, and global climate change”.  Davis (2015) enjoins us to join the 
“Pigou Club” (Mankiw, 2009) and support higher gasoline and diesel taxes.   
Since gasoline is a relative complement to leisure, the optimal gasoline tax is significantly 
higher than the marginal damages from gasoline consumption (West and Williams, 2007).  
Economists have calculated the optimal gasoline tax to be $1.01/gallon in the United States (Parry 
and Small, 2005); $1.34/gallon in the United Kingdom is $1.34/gal (Parry and Small, 2005); 
$1.58/gallon in China (Lin and Zeng, 2014); $1.37 in the state of California (Lin and Prince, 2009); 
and 40.57 cents per litre in 2006 Canadian dollars in Ontario and the Greater Toronto-Hamilton 
Area in Canada (Wood, 2015).   
A recent study by the International Monetary Fund estimates energy taxes for more than 
150 countries (Parry et al., 2014a).  The efficient set of fuel taxes for developed and developing 
countries would include charges on fuel use for carbon and local pollution (with credits for 
emissions capture during combustion) and additional charges on motor fuels for road congestion 
and accidents (though the latter should transition to distance-based charges). For most countries, 
efficient fuel taxes could yield considerable fiscal, health, and carbon benefits (Parry et al., 2014b). 
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One incentive- (or market-) based instrument that many economists recommend for 
addressing global climate change is a carbon tax.  Carbon taxes efficiently reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions (Williams et al., 2015).   An efficient carbon tax would be one that is imposed on the 
carbon content of fossil fuels at a rate equal to the social cost of carbon, and would rise slowly 
over time, reflecting the projected rise over time in the social cost of carbon (Williams, 2017).   
Although a carbon tax would likely slow economic growth, its adverse effect on economic 
growth is very small, especially if the tax revenue is used in ways that promote economic growth, 
such as cutting marginal rates of other taxes, reducing the budget deficit, or financing growth-
enhancing public goods (Williams, 2017).  
Similarly, although a carbon tax would also be mildly regressive, imposing a slightly higher 
burden on lower-income households than on higher-income households, it is much less regressive 
than it is widely perceived to be. Moreover, as the incidence of a carbon tax depends on how the 
tax revenue is used (Williams et al., 2015), the regressivity of a carbon tax could be overcome if 
some of the revenue is used in a progressive  way (Williams, 2017).  Recycling revenues to cut 
capital taxes is efficient but exacerbates regressivity.  Lump sum rebates are less efficient, but 
much more progressive, benefiting the three lower income quintiles even when ignoring 
environmental benefits.  A labor tax swap represents an intermediate option, as it is more 
progressive than a capital tax swap and more efficient than a rebate (Williams et al., 2015). 
Standard economic theory predicts that, when regulating externalities, incentive- (or 
market-) based price (tax) and quantity (cap-and-trade) instruments will produce identical 
outcomes when transaction costs are negligible and marginal abatement costs are known with 
certainty by the regulator (Adar and Griffin, 1976; Stavins, 1995; Weitzman, 1974).  Uncertainties 
regarding marginal abatement costs generate different policy prescriptions depending on the 
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relative slopes of the marginal damage and marginal abatement cost curves; a relatively flat 
marginal damage curve would make a price instrument relatively more attractive and vice versa 
(Adar and Griffin, 1976; Weitzman, 1974).  
While uncertainties regarding marginal abatement costs may matter, the literature largely 
agrees that uncertainty over marginal damages alone has no impact on the equivalence of 
incentive- (or market-) based price (tax) and quantity (cap-and-trade) instruments: according to 
standard economic theory, even in the presence of uncertainty over marginal damages, both price 
instruments and quantity instruments perform equally in terms of their ex post efficiency.  Stavins 
(1996) finds that uncertainties in marginal damages only matter if uncertainties in marginal 
damages and uncertainties in marginal abatement costs are simultaneous and correlated with each 
other.   
For many environmental externalities, marginal damages are uncertain; a stark example of 
an environmental externality with uncertain marginal damages is global climate change 
(Weitzman, 2014; Rudik, 2018).  Even though uncertainty over marginal damages may not matter 
in theory, it may be important in practice since such uncertainty may lead to behavioral responses, 
or what Shogren and Taylor (2008) call “behavioral failures”.  Such behavioral responses include 
endowment effects, fairness concerns, attitudes towards risk deviating from the expected utility 
framework, and cognitive costs.  If the behavioral responses of market participants differ under 
price and quantity instruments, then incentive- (or market-) based price (tax) and quantity (cap-
and-trade) instruments instruments may lead to different outcomes.  Owing to behavioral 
responses, and in contrast with standard economic theory, price instruments and quantity 
instruments may lead to different outcomes even when transaction costs are negligible and 
marginal abatement costs are known with certainty by the regulator (Heres and Lin Lawell, 2018).   
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Heres and Lin Lawell (2018) examine the effects of uncertainty in marginal damages on 
the outcomes of incentive- (or market-) based price (tax) and quantity (cap-and-trade) instruments.  
They develop a theory model to compare the equilibria under price and quantity instruments with 
and without behavioral responses.  They then conduct a laboratory experiment to evaluate the 
equivalence of price and quantity instruments when marginal damages are uncertain but marginal 
abatement costs are known with certainty. According to their results, in terms of aggregate 
emissions, the quantity-equivalence of quantity and price instruments cannot be rejected when 
marginal damages are known with certainty. However, when marginal damages are uncertain, the 
implementation of an optimal tax leads to more emissions compared to those achieved with a 
tradable permit system capped at the optimal amount of emissions. The results from their analysis 
of individual decisions and permit prices provide evidence for behavioral responses from 
endowment effects and risk attitudes proposed by prospect theory which cause price and quantity 
instruments to lead to different outcomes (Heres and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
If price and quantity instruments are no longer equivalent when marginal damages are 
uncertain because of behavioral responses, policy-makers should consider the possibility of 
behavioral responses in the design of policy and in their choice of whether to use a price or quantity 
instrument (Heres and Lin Lawell, 2018).   
 
3. Subsidies 
Gasoline taxes have been touted by many economists as an efficient and relatively simple 
tool to address environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. 
However, rather than removing subsidies and increasing gasoline taxes, many countries still 
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subsidize gasoline (Lin Lawell, 2017), which may have the opposite effect of exacerbating the 
environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption.  
Recent estimates show that global post-tax fossil fuel subsidies have reached a staggering 
$4.9 trillion worldwide in 2013 and $5.3 trillion in 2015, representing 6.5% of global GDP (Coady 
et al., 2017).  According to detailed measurements of net gasoline taxes and subsidies, 33 countries 
subsidized gasoline for at least one 12-month period from 2003 to 2015, and 9 countries subsidized 
gasoline for the entire period.  Moreover, while two-thirds of these 33 countries increased their net 
gasoline taxes from 2003 to 2015, the global mean gasoline tax fell by 13.3 percent due to a shift 
in consumption towards states that maintain gasoline subsidies or that have low taxes (Ross, 
Hazlett and Mahdavi, 2017).  
There is variation in net gasoline taxes and subsidies across different regions of the world. 
Europe and North America have the highest net taxes, while oil-rich countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa have the lowest net taxes. Countries that subsidize gasoline also keep their 
gasoline prices fixed and are economically dependent on oil or natural gas exports, perhaps due to 
political pressure to distribute resource revenues (Ross, Hazlett and Mahdavi, 2017). 
The prevalence of gasoline subsidies worldwide and the fall in the global mean gasoline 
tax may exacerbate air pollution from the resulting increase in gasoline consumption.  This is 
particularly the case for oil-rich countries in the Middle East and North Africa that have the lowest 
net taxes (Kheiravar and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
In Iran, domestic energy prices, including gasoline prices, are set administratively rather 
than by the market. The Iranian government has heavily subsidized petroleum products, utilities, 
as well as a few food products for over three decades since the early 1980s. These subsidies were 
originally introduced to manage the economic challenges during the war against Iraq. The energy 
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subsidies in particular turned Iran into one of the most energy intensive countries due to the over-
consumption resulting from artificially low national energy prices, and over the past two decades 
different administrations have tried to cut back on the energy subsidies (Kheiravar and Lin Lawell, 
2018).  Kheiravar and Lin Lawell (2018) evaluate the effects of transportation fuel subsidies and 
the Iranian energy subsidy reform on air quality, and find that reforms that have cut back on 
transportation fuel subsidies have improved air quality in Tehran.       
Another transportation-related subsidy are emissions-based car subsidies and taxes.  
Alberini et al. (2018) analyze whether subsidies (taxes) that reward (penalize) low (high) emitters 
induce changes in the retirement of existing and inefficient vehicles.  They exploit natural 
experiment conditions in Switzerland to analyze the impact of three different “bonus”/“malus” 
annual registration fee schemes implemented at the cantonal level. In the three schemes, the bonus 
rewards new, fuel-efficient vehicles. The malus is retroactive in canton Obwalden (i.e., it is 
charged on both new and existing high-emitting cars), but prospective in Geneva and Ticino.  
Alberini et al. (2018) find that while the bonus/malus in Obwalden hastens the retirement of 
existing high-emitting vehicles (by around 5%), the scheme in Geneva postpones retirement (by 
some 3%), and there are no statistically significant effects in Ticino.  
The development of the ethanol industry in the U.S. has historically been accompanied by 
government subsidies.  Ethanol production subsidies were implemented by the federal government 
in order to promote ethanol as a way to reduce dependence on imported oil (Pear, 2012).  The 
launch of the ethanol industry was initiated in part by a production subsidy of 40 cents per gallon 
provided in the Energy Policy Act of 1978.  Since then, the level of the subsidy has been modified 
a couple of times (Tyner, 2007).  Most recently, the federal ethanol production subsidy was 
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reduced from 51 cents per gallon to 45 cents per gallon in the 2008 Farm Bill, and subsequently 
eliminated on December 31, 2011.  
According to conventional wisdom, an output subsidy is more efficient than an input 
subsidy as a means of encouraging output of a good, because an input subsidy distorts the choice 
of inputs away from the least-cost combination, while an output subsidy does not (Parish and 
McLaren, 1982).  Schmalensee (1980) argues that if some commodity is more valuable to society 
than its market price indicates, then the best remedy is to use an output subsidy to increase its 
market value.  Because other types of subsidies are less direct and build in extraneous incentives, 
they are strictly inferior in cost and efficiency terms (Schmalensee, 1980).   
In their analysis of the choice between using investment and output subsidies to promote 
socially desirable production, Aldy, Gerarden and Sweeney (2018) find from their theory model 
that output will be greater under the output subsidy, though the extent of the difference in output 
depends on the convexity of the production costs.  They find empirically that, owing to subsidy 
incentives, wind farms choosing the investment subsidy produce 10 to 11 percent less power per 
unit capacity than wind farms selecting the output subsidy, and that investment subsidies cost more 
to the Federal government per unit of output from wind farms than an output subsidy (Aldy, 
Gerarden and Sweeney, 2018). 
Parish and McLaren (1982) analyze the relative cost-effectiveness of input and output 
subsidies using a static model.  They observe that subsidy payments to inframarginal units of input 
or output are wasted from the point of view of encouraging expanded production.  Subsidies may 
differ in their cost-effectiveness if they differ in the amounts absorbed by inframarginal units of 
the item subsidized, and these differences arise in the presence of increasing of decreasing returns 
to scale, and because of changes in input intensities as production expands.  In particular, Parish 
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and McLaren (1982) find that with decreasing returns to scale, inputs are more productive on the 
average than at the margin, and thus total payments made under an input subsidy, if spread over 
the total output, would represent a lower rate of subsidy per unit output (and a lower total payment) 
than under the output subsidy. 
Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) develop a stylized theory model to provide intuition on 
which types of subsidies are more cost-effective for inducing investment in firm capacity, and how 
the presence of a mandate affects the relative cost-effectiveness of different types of subsidies.  
They build on the insight of Parish and McLaren (1982) that subsidy payments to inframarginal 
units of input or output are wasted from the point of view of encouraging expanded production.   
Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) extend the analysis of Parish and McLaren (1982) along 
several dimensions.  First, Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) use a dynamic model rather than a 
static model.  As the input whose potential subsidy they analyze is capital, and as capital 
investment is inherently a dynamic problem involving incurring investment costs in the present 
for future gain, a dynamic model is more appropriate than a static model for analyzing capital 
investment, and may capture additional nuances a static analysis may overlook.  For example, one 
nuance that arises with a dynamic model is that when multiple periods of time are considered, the 
government must pay any production subsidy for each unit of production in all periods of time, 
including each unit of production in periods even before any investment has taken place, even 
though these units of production are inframarginal.  Whereas a static model assumes that any 
investment is made right away, a dynamic model recognizes that investments are dynamic 
decisions that may take time to occur, and that firms may additionally account for the option value 
to waiting before making any investment.  A dynamic analysis would therefore consider as a 
drawback of production subsidies that the government would need to pay the production subsidy 
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for every unit of production that takes place before any investment is made, even though these 
units of production are all inframarginal. 
A second extension Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) make to the Parish and McLaren 
(1982) analysis is to model an industry in which production is highly correlated with capacity.  
Such a model is well-suited for describing industries such as ethanol and oil where there is little 
or no idle capacity, so that output is highly correlated with capacity.  In the oil industry, for 
example, production is essentially determined by the number of wells drilled, as once a well is 
drilled, there is a high opportunity cost of shutting in a well (Anderson, Kellogg and Salant, 2018; 
Boomhower, 2016). As Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) show and explain in their empirical 
analysis, for the ethanol plants in their data set over the time period of their analysis, production is 
highly correlated with capacity.  When production is highly correlated with capacity, the objective 
of encouraging expanded production can be reformulated as an objective of inducing investment 
in firm capacity. 
A third extension Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) make to the Parish and McLaren 
(1982) analysis is to analyze the relative cost-effectiveness of different types of subsidies for 
inducing investment in firm capacity.  While Parish and McLaren (1982) compare input and output 
subsidies, Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) compare output (or production) subsidies with 
investment subsidies and entry subsidies. 
A fourth extension Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) make to the Parish and McLaren 
(1982) analysis is to allow for strategic interactions and oligopolistic behavior among firms.  While 
Parish and McLaren (1982) model a static firm in isolation, Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018)  
develop an econometric model of a dynamic game among incumbents and potential entrants in the 
ethanol industry. 
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Parish and McLaren (1982) find in their static analysis that input subsidies are more cost-
effective than output subsidies when there are decreasing returns to scale.  In the model of Yi, Lin 
Lawell and Thome (2018), decreasing returns to scale similarly makes an investment subsidy 
relatively more cost-effective than production subsidies in inducing investment that otherwise 
would not occur.  However, in the dynamic model of Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018), owing in 
part to dynamic considerations, strategic interactions, and a high correlation between production 
and capacity, whether production subsidies are more cost-effective than investment subsidies 
depends on the parameters, even under decreasing returns to scale, and is therefore an empirical 
question. 
Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) then develop and estimate a structural econometric 
model of a dynamic game to empirically examine whether it costs more to the government to 
induce marginal investment via a production subsidy, an investment subsidy, or an entry in the 
context of the ethanol industry in the United States.   While conventional wisdom and some of the 
previous literature favor production subsidies over investment subsidies, and while historically the 
federal government has used production subsidies to support ethanol, the empirical results  of Yi, 
Lin Lawell and Thome (2018) show that, for the ethanol industry, investment subsidies and entry 
subsidies are more cost-effective than production subsidies for inducing investment that otherwise 
would not have occurred. 
 
4. Mandates 
Politicians and regulatory agencies in the U.S. have passed or considered a suite of policies 
to decrease emissions in the transportation sector, including carbon taxes, fuel economy standards, 
renewable fuel mandates, and regional or federal emissions trading programs. If unpriced 
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emissions are the sole market failure, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program can achieve the first-
best market allocation (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960), while renewable fuel mandates are strictly 
second-best (Helfand, 1992; Holland, Knittel and Hughes, 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 2012; Lade 
and Lin Lawell, 2018).  This is because fuel mandates implicitly subsidize renewable fuels even if 
the renewable fuel still generates some emissions (Lade and Lin Lawell, 2018).  Despite this, 
typically favor renewable fuel mandates over taxes and cap-and-trade programs to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from transportation fuels.  
The most prominent fuel mandates in the U.S. currently are the federal Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS), a renewable fuel share mandate; and California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
(LCFS), a carbon intensity standard.  To comply with renewable fuel mandates, both upstream 
firms and downstream consumers must invest in new technologies.  For example, the RFS requires 
36 billion gallons (bgals) of ethanol to be blended into the U.S. fuel supply each year by 2022, of 
which 16 billion gallons must be biofuel derived from cellulosic feedstocks. Meeting these targets 
will require tremendous investments in the research and development, commercialization, and 
production of cellulosic biofuels. In addition, consumers must purchase millions of vehicles 
capable of using high-ethanol blend fuels (Lade and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
Delays in the development and deployment of new technologies when binding mandates 
exist for their use may lead to situations with high short-run compliance costs. The problem 
compounds if compliance credits are bankable, in which case the anticipation of high future 
compliance costs may lead to significant increases in credit prices in the present. This situation has 
already borne out under the RFS. In 2013, the fuel industry anticipated that the statutory mandates 
would become increasingly difficult to meet beyond 2014. This caused RFS compliance credit 
prices to increase from $0.10/gal to $1.40/gal over the course of only a few months. The large and 
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sudden increase in compliance costs set off a prolonged period of regulatory uncertainty and delay 
as the EPA considered how to best address these challenges, and eventually led to the Agency 
relaxing the mandates, thereby reducing the incentive to invest in the technologies required to meet 
the future objectives of the RFS (Lade, Lin Lawell and Smith, 2018b).  
There is an extensive literature studying fuel mandates. These include papers that study the 
market effects of carbon intensity standards and renewable fuel mandates (de Gorter and Just, 
2009; Holland, Knittel and Hughes, 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 2012; Moschini, Lapan and Kim., 
2017; Just, 2017); explore channels of mandate compliance (Korting and Just, 2017); compare the 
relative performance of fuel mandates to more traditional policy instruments such as carbon taxes 
(Holland et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014), or subsidies for production, investment, or entry (Yi, Lin 
Lawell and Thome, 2018); study unintended consequences of the policies and their relative 
efficiency when markets are imperfectly competitive (Holland, 2012) or open to trade (Rajagopal 
et al., 2011); examine ways policy-makers can increase the efficiency fuel mandates through 
strategic policy choices (Lemoine, 2016); and analyze how well mandates perform as innovation 
incentives (Clancy and Moschini, 2018). 
There is also a literature studying the effects and efficiency of hybrid price-quantity 
policies. Roberts and Spence (1976) first proposed pairing a fixed non-compliance penalty and 
abatement subsidy with a tradable credit policy to bound compliance costs and reduce the expected 
social cost of a policy when costs and benefits are uncertain. A large literature has subsequently 
studied similar proposals, primarily in the context of emission trading programs (see e.g., Pizer, 
2002; Newell, Pizer and Zhang, 2005; Burtraw, Palmer and Kahn, 2010; Fell and Morgenstern, 
2010).  In addition, it has been shown in the previous literature that a rate-based standard can 
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achieve the first-best if it is coupled with an emissions tax (Holland, Knittel and Hughes, 2009) or 
a consumption tax (Holland, 2012).  
Lade and Lin Lawell (2018) build on this work by analyzing if one can improve the 
efficiency of renewable fuel mandates, including volumetric standards, by coupling the mandate 
with a cost containment mechanism.  To this end, they formalize, expand upon, and synthesize the 
previous literature studying renewable fuel mandates by developing a model of mandates under 
perfect competition that incorporates both a renewable share mandate and a carbon intensity 
standard, both with and without a cost containment mechanism. The extant literature has 
traditionally considered cost containment mechanisms as tools for increasing program efficiency 
and decreasing compliance cost uncertainty (Newell, Pizer and Zhang, 2005; Nemet, 2010; Fell et 
al., 2012; Fell, 2016).  In contrast, Lade and Lin Lawell (2018) show that cost containment 
mechanisms may substantially increase the efficiency of a policy even in settings with no 
uncertainty.  
In particular, Lade and Lin Lawell (2018) show that whenever the marginal cost of 
renewable fuels is high relative to fossil fuels, cost containment mechanisms have the benefit of 
both constraining compliance costs and limiting deadweight loss. If both the mandate and cost 
containment mechanism are set optimally, the efficiency of the policy increases substantially over 
optimally setting the fuel mandates alone. In a limiting case, an LCFS with an optimal cost 
containment mechanism can achieve the first-best outcome. Using a numerical model of the U.S. 
gasoline market, Lade and Lin Lawell (2018) show that the efficiency gains from strategically 
including a credit window offering with a fuel mandate are economically significant. 
Renewable energy mandates for new technologies exist in contexts other than the 
transportation fuel sector as well. Many states have ambitious renewable portfolio standards that 
16 
 
require significant investments in renewable electricity generation. If they are used instead of 
incentive-based instruments, quantity-based mandates such as the federal Renewable Fuel 
Standard, California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, renewable portfolio standards, and the Clean 
Power Plan should be combined with a cost containment mechanism.   However, incentive-based 
instruments should be used instead of mandates whenever possible.   
There is also a literature on analyzing mandates and standards related to vehicles (Sallee 
and Slemrod, 2012; Klier and Linn, 2016; Anderson and Sallee, 2016; Levinson, 2016; Kellogg, 
2017; Bento, Gillingham and Roth, 2017; Leard, Linn and McConnell, 2017; Huse and Koptyug, 
2017; Ito and Sallee, 2018).  Despite widespread agreement that a carbon tax would be more 
efficient (Williams, 2017), and although an increase in gasoline prices could result in a sizable 
increase in fleet fuel economy, presenting opportunities for the development and  diffusion of fuel-
saving technological advances in the form of favorable consumer sentiment and political  
environment (Li, Timmins and von Haefen, 2009), many countries use fuel economy standards to 
reduce transportation-related carbon dioxide emissions.  
Davis and Knittel (2016) pair a simple model of the automakers’ profit maximization 
problem with unusually-rich nationally representative data on vehicle registrations to estimate the 
distributional impact of U.S. fuel economy standards. The key insight from the model is that fuel 
economy standards impose a constraint on automakers which creates an implicit subsidy for fuel-
efficient vehicles and an implicit tax for fuel-inefficient vehicles (Davis and Knittel, 2016).   
Jacobsen (2013) employs an empirically estimated model to study the equilibrium effects 
of an increase in the US corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, and finds that the 
overall welfare costs are regressive.  
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Klier and Linn (2012) analyze the medium‐run effects of the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standard by employing a novel empirical strategy that accounts for the 
endogeneity of vehicle characteristics by exploiting the variation in engine models used in vehicle 
models.  According to their results, the regulatory costs of an increase in the CAFE standard are 
significantly smaller in the medium run than in the short run (Klier and Linn, 2012). 
An issue that arises with fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles is the possibility 
of a rebound effect: higher fuel economy reduces per-mile driving costs and may increase miles 
traveled.  Using data from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey and simultaneously 
relaxing several assumptions employed in previous studies using micro data, Linn (2016) estimates 
that the change in miles traveled for a one percent increase in the fuel economy of all vehicles 
belonging to a household is 0.2 to 0.4, which suggests that the rebound effect could erode roughly 
one-third of the fuel savings caused by the regulated increase in US passenger vehicle fuel 
economy between 2005 and 2014.  
China introduced its first fuel economy standard (GB 19578-2004) in September 2004.  
The fuel economy standard was a fuel consumption of 6.9 L per 100 km by 2015, which translates 
to an estimated 167 grams of CO2 emissions per kilometer.  In addition to the fuel economy 
standard, China also has a Corporate Average Fuel Consumption (CAFC) standard (GB 27999-
2011), which went into effect in 2012.  The CAFC standard is a target level for a firm’s sales-
weighted average fuel consumption, where the target is a sales-weighted average of individual fuel 
consumption targets for each vehicle model (Chen, Lin Lawell and Wang, 2018).  
By developing and estimating a structural econometric model of China’s automobile 
market as a mixed oligopolistic differentiated products market in which different consumers may 
vary in how much they like different car characteristics on the demand side, and in which state-
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owned automobile companies may have different objectives than private automobile companies 
on the supply side, Chen and Lin Lawell (2018) find that China’s Corporate Average Fuel 
Consumption (CAFC) standard is inefficient, and that the alternative vehicle market share, 
consumer surplus, private firm profits, and state-owned firm utility would all increase if China 
removed its CAFC standard and made its fuel economy standard more stringent instead.  
The intuition is as follows.  Chen and Lin Lawell (2018) find that, all else equal, a more 
stringent fuel economy standard favors vehicles whose fuel efficiency exceed their respective 
target, lowering their relative prices, which has the possibility of increasing alternative vehicle 
market share; consumer surplus, particularly for consumers of fuel efficient and/or alternative 
vehicles, and those who can now switch to fuel efficient and/or alternative vehicles as a result of 
their lower relative price; average private firm profit; and/or average state-owned firm utility.  In 
contrast, China’s CAFC standard is inefficient, in part because the CAFC standard does not require 
that each vehicle model achieve a minimum fuel efficiency target, but instead allows firms to 
average across all the vehicle models that they produce; in part owing to the compliance cost and 
computational cost burden to firms of having to average across all the vehicle models they produce; 
and also in part because there is already a fuel economy standard in place.  Thus, removing the 
CAFC standard and making the fuel economy standard more stringent will best ensure that all cars 
meet a stringent minimum fuel efficiency target (Chen and Lin Lawell, 2018).   
 
5. Restrictions 
Another type of policy that has been implemented to address the emissions and other 
externalities associated with the transportation sector is a driving restriction.  A typical driving 
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restriction prohibits drivers from using their vehicles on given weekdays, based on the last digits 
of their vehicles’ license plates (Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya, 2017).   
License plate-based driving restrictions have been widely used as a method to reduce urban 
air pollution and traffic congestion in developing countries. Santiago, Chile introduced a license 
plate-based driving restriction in 1986 and Mexico City, Mexico introduced a driving restriction, 
Hoy No Circula, in 1989. Following these two, several more Latin American cities have introduced 
license plate-based driving restrictions, including Bogotá, Colombia and São Paulo, Brazil.  Other 
Colombian cities that have implemented license plate-based driving restrictions include 
Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Manizales, Pereira, Barranquilla, Armenia, Cali, and Medellín.  Beijing 
and its neighboring city Tianjin also implemented license plate-based driving restrictions during 
the 2008 Olympic Games and a modified version of the restriction continued in Beijing after the 
Olympics.  Driving restrictions have also been implemented in cities of some developed countries 
as well, including Paris in 2015 (Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya, 2017). 
In the first-best, driving during each hour of each day would be charged a fee or tax per 
vehicle mile traveled, equal to the marginal damages of an additional vehicle mile traveled during 
that hour of that day, so that individual households will each choose the socially optimal choice of 
when and how much to drive during the week.  In contrast to the first-best, a license plate-based 
driving restriction restricts a household from driving during certain hours of the day for certain 
days of the week (Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya, 2017).   
In addition to license plate-based driving restrictions, another type of driving restriction are 
low emission zones, which define areas that vehicles may enter only if they are classified as low 
emission vehicles (Wolff and Perry, 2010).  Another form of driving regulation are congestion 
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charges (Leape, 2006; Gibson and Carnovale, 2015).  Cropper et al. (2014) evaluate the costs and 
emissions reductions of a program that requires people to buy permits to drive on high-ozone days.   
In the previous literature on the effects of license plate-based driving restrictions, Eskeland 
and Feyzioglu (1997) examine the effect of Hoy No Circula on gasoline demand and car ownership 
in Mexico City during the period 1984-1993.   Davis (2008) measures the effect of Hoy No Circula 
on air quality during the period 1986-1993 by using a regression discontinuity design to control 
for possible confounding factors.  These two studies find no evidence that Hoy No Circula 
improved air quality in Mexico City. 
Gallego, Montero and Salas (2013a,b) find in their analysis of Hoy No Circula that policies 
that may appear effective in the short run can be highly detrimental in the long run, after 
households have adjusted their stock of vehicles.  Blackman et al. (2018) use a contingent valuation 
method to measure the costs of Mexico City’s Hoy No Circula, and find that the Mexican 
program’s costs are substantial: up to $130 per vehicle per year, which represents 1-2 percent of 
drivers’ annual income and implies total costs of $617 million per year.  
Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya (2017) build upon and synthesize the existing literature 
by developing a theoretical model of license plate-based driving restrictions that incorporates three 
behavioral channels highlighted by the literature that may affect the effectiveness of a license plate-
based driving restriction.  One behavioral channel that may affect the effectiveness of license plate-
based driving restrictions is the possibility that households may intertemporally substitute their 
driving during restricted hours with driving during unrestricted hours.  Davis (2008) finds that 
estimates for the effects of Hoy No Circula on air pollution during nonpeak weekdays and 
weekends tend to be positive, consistent with intertemporal substitution toward nighttime and 
weekend driving when the driving restrictions are not in place.   
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Two other behavioral channels that may affect the effectiveness of license plate-based 
driving restrictions that Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya (2017) incorporate in their theory 
model are the possibility that households may purchase a second car and the possibility that 
households may take an alternative mode of transportation.  Davis (2008) explains the lack of an 
improvement in air quality resulting from Hoy No Circula with data from vehicle registrations and 
automobile sales which indicate that the program led to an increase in the total number of vehicles 
in circulation as well as a change in the composition of vehicles toward used, and thus higher-
emitting, vehicles.  In addition, Davis (2008) finds no evidence of an increase in public 
transportation ridership.    
In addition to identifying substitution, the purchase of a second car, and the use of 
alternative modes of transportation as three behavioral channels through which license plate-based 
driving restrictions may be ineffective or even potentially increase air pollution, the theoretical 
model of Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya (2017) also incorporates insights from differences in 
the sources and atmospheric chemistry of different air pollutants.  Zhang, Lin Lawell and 
Umanskaya (2017) show that the complex atmospheric chemistry of ozone smog formation may 
further cause driving restrictions to be ineffective or even have perverse consequences.  The 
difficulty of regulating ozone smog in particular is also examined by Auffhammer and Kellogg 
(2011), who find that federal gasoline standards, which allow refiners flexibility in choosing a 
compliance mechanism, do not reduce ozone pollution because minimizing the cost of compliance 
does not reduce emissions of those compounds most prone to forming ozone; and by Salvo and 
Wang (2017), who find that increased ethanol use in the gasoline-ethanol vehicle fleet leads to 
higher ozone concentrations in urban São Paulo’s ambient air. 
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 After developing a theoretical model of license plate-based driving restrictions that 
incorporates substitution, the possibility of purchasing a second car or taking public transit, sources 
of air pollutants, and atmospheric chemistry, Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya (2017) examine 
the hypotheses of their model in light of suggestive empirical evidence from the license plate-
based driving restriction implemented in Bogotá, Colombia.  Consistent with their theory model, 
Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya (2017) find suggestive empirical evidence that under certain 
circumstances, due to substitution, the purchase of a second car, the use of alternative modes of 
transportation, and/or atmospheric chemistry, it is possible for license plate-based driving 
restrictions to increase air pollution.  Also consistent with their theory, Zhang, Lin Lawell and 
Umanskaya (2017) find that license plate-based driving restrictions may have different effects on 
different air pollutants, reflecting heterogeneity in the sources and atmospheric chemistry of the 
pollutants.  In particular, owing to atmospheric chemistry, it is possible for a license plate-based 
driving restriction to cause a significant decrease in NO and a significant increase in NO2, NOx, 
and O3 (Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya, 2017). 
 
6. Investment 
The government has two potential roles in the surface transportation sector. The first 
potential role for government is to provide transportation infrastructure in the form of roads and 
public transit systems; and also to operate public transit services.  Once the infrastructure is in 
place, a second potential role for government is to employ policy instruments (such as taxes and 
other forms of regulation relating to safety, environmental standards, travel demand management 
policies, and so forth) in order to address the market failures that are inherent to unregulated 
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transportation activity; and also to determine the operational aspects of public transit service 
(Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2015; Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
A contentious issue currently confronting transportation analysts and policy-makers is 
what the effects of public transit investment on congestion and on air quality are, and therefore 
what the appropriate level of public transit investment should be (Beaudoin and Lin Lawell, 2017; 
Beaudoin and Lin Lawell, 2018b).  While public transit receives plenty of political support for its 
“green” reputation and its contribution to sustainability, there is also an ongoing debate in policy 
circles regarding the efficacy of public transit investment as a means of addressing traffic 
congestion: some display skepticism regarding the congestion-reduction possibilities of public 
transit (Rubin, Moore and Lee, 1999; Stopher, 2004; Rubin and Mansour, 2013), while others 
advocate for transit investment (Litman, 2014).  Similarly, while several studies have considered 
the relationship between automobile travel and air quality, and although there is generally a 
consensus that auto travel leads to adverse health outcomes, there is very little empirical evidence 
on the incremental effect that public transit supply may or may not have on air quality (Beaudoin, 
Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2015). 
In the first-best, a Pigouvian tax would be levied on auto travel, which generates a direct 
price for the emissions and congestion externalities, and not only limits the deviation from the 
socially optimal level of travel and helps utilize existing capacity more efficiently, but also results 
in a volume of travel that provides an appropriate signal for the optimal level of capacity 
investment in the future.  However, if policy instruments that would in theory achieve a first-best 
outcome cannot be employed due to various economic and political constraints, then it is of interest 
to analyze potential second-best solutions available to policy-makers (Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin 
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Lawell, 2018). The general concept of subsidizing a substitute good in the presence of an 
uncorrected distortion has long been established (Baumol and Bradford, 1970). 
Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell (2018) develop a theoretical model to analyze what role, 
if any, public transit investment should play in addressing traffic congestion in urban transportation 
networks.  In particular, they evaluate the extent to which traffic congestion should be accounted 
for when determining the optimal second-best level of investment in public transit infrastructure 
in the absence of a first-best Pigouvian congestion tax on auto travel. Their model of second-best 
public transit investment contributes to the literature by allowing for both demand and cost 
interdependencies between the auto and transit modes.  In particular, owing to cost 
interdependencies between the auto and transit modes when transit shares the right-of-way with 
auto traffic, “mixed traffic” transit investment can affect the equilibrium volume of auto travel 
through shifts in the auto travel cost function as well as the demand function (Beaudoin, Farzin 
and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
The results of Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell (2018) indicate that the level of transit 
investment should be higher relative to that chosen when the congestion-reduction effects of transit 
are not accounted for, but the importance of this consideration is dependent  upon the interaction 
of demand and cost interdependencies between the auto and transit modes, which may vary across 
regions.  Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell (2018)  calibrate their theoretical model with panel data 
from 96 urban areas across the United States over the period 1991 to 2011, and find that, due to 
differences in cost interdependence and cross-modal substitution, fixed guideway transit 
investments are expected to yield higher congestion-reduction benefits than mixed transit modes 
in dense regions.  Their results suggest that urban mass transit may have a co-benefit of congestion 
reduction. As a consequence, prospective public transit projects should not be evaluated 
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exclusively in terms of the forecasted net welfare generated by public transit users, but instead 
should also include interactions between auto and transit users in the cost-benefit analysis 
framework (Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2018). 
To empirically analyze whether public transit is a means to address traffic congestion 
within urban transportation networks, Beaudoin and Lin Lawell (2018b) estimate the effect of past  
public transit investment on the demand for automobile transportation by applying an instrumental 
variable approach that accounts for the potential endogeneity of public transit investment, and that 
distinguishes between the substitution effect and the equilibrium effect, to a panel dataset of 96 
urban areas across the U.S. over the years 1991-2011. Their results show that, owing to the 
countervailing effects of substitution and induced demand, the effects of increases in public transit 
supply on auto travel depend on the time horizon.  In the short run, when accounting for the 
substitution effect only, Beaudoin and Lin Lawell (2018b)  find that on average a 10% increase in 
transit capacity leads to a 0.7% reduction in auto travel. However, transit has no effect on auto 
travel in the medium run, as latent and induced demand offset the substitution effect.  In the long 
run, when accounting for both substitution and induced demand, Beaudoin and Lin Lawell (2018b)  
find that on average a 10% increase in transit capacity is associated with a 0.4% increase in auto 
travel. They also find that public transit supply does not have a significant effect on auto travel 
when traffic congestion is below a threshold level.  Additionally, they find that there is substantial 
heterogeneity across urban areas, with public transit having significantly different effects on auto 
travel demand in smaller, less densely populated regions with less-developed public transit 
networks than in larger, more densely populated regions with more extensive public transit 
networks (Beaudoin and Lin Lawell, 2018b).    
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In recent decades, air quality in the U.S. has improved substantially. Over this time, there 
has been also been a steady increase in the volume of transit capacity supplied.  Beaudoin and Lin 
Lawell (2018a) analyze whether any of the substantial improvement in air quality can be attributed 
to increased public transit supply. To do so, they develop an equilibrium model of transit and 
automobile travel volumes as a function of the level of transit supplied. They then empirically 
analyze the effects of the level of transit supply on observed ambient pollution levels by applying 
an instrumental variables approach that accounts for the potential endogeneity of public transit 
investment to a panel dataset of 96 urban areas across the U.S.  In particular, they analyze the 
effects of the level of transit supply on the following criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), 
lead (Pb), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), ozone (O3), particulate matter (PM), and sulfur dioxide (SO2).   
Prospective public transit projects should not be evaluated exclusively in terms of the 
forecasted net welfare generated by public transit users, but instead should also include interactions 
between auto and transit users in the cost-benefit analysis framework.   Nevertheless, while public 
transit investment may be able to play a complementary role, efficient pricing of auto travel 
remains necessary to address traffic congestion in the U.S. (Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 
2018). 
 
7. Conclusion 
The transportation sector is associated with many negative externalities, including air 
pollution, global climate change, and traffic congestion.   Most economists generally recommend 
that policy-makers use incentive- (or market-) based instruments as opposed to command and 
control policies (including quantity-based mandates) whenever possible (Auffhammer et al., 2016; 
Lade, Lin Lawell and Smith, 2018a).  Whenever unpriced emissions are the sole market failure, 
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incentive-based instruments such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program are more likely to 
achieve the social optimum and maximize social net benefits (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960).   
Owing to behavioral responses, and in contrast with standard economic theory, incentive- 
(or market-) based price (tax) and quantity (cap-and-trade) instruments may lead to different 
outcomes even when transaction costs are negligible and marginal abatement costs are known with 
certainty by the regulator.  If price and quantity instruments are no longer equivalent when 
marginal damages are uncertain because of behavioral responses, policy-makers should consider 
the possibility of behavioral responses in the design of policy and in their choice of whether to use 
a price or quantity instrument (Heres and Lin Lawell, 2018).   
 Gasoline taxes have been touted by many economists as an efficient and relatively simple 
tool to address environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. 
However, rather than removing subsidies and increasing gasoline taxes, many countries still 
subsidize gasoline (Lin Lawell, 2017), which may have the opposite effect of exacerbating the 
environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption.  
The development of the ethanol industry in the U.S. has historically been accompanied by 
government subsidies.  While conventional wisdom and some of the previous literature favor 
production subsidies over investment subsidies, and while historically the federal government has 
used production subsidies to support ethanol, owing in part to dynamic considerations, strategic 
interactions, and a high correlation between production and capacity, whether production subsidies 
are more cost-effective than investment subsidies depends on the parameters, even under 
decreasing returns to scale, and is therefore an empirical question (Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome, 
2018).  Recent empirical results show that, for the ethanol industry, investment subsidies and entry 
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subsidies are more cost-effective than production subsidies for inducing investment that otherwise 
would not have occurred (Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome, 2018). 
  Politicians and regulatory agencies in the U.S. have passed or considered a suite of 
policies to decrease emissions in the transportation sector, including carbon taxes, fuel economy 
standards, renewable fuel mandates, and regional or federal emissions trading programs. If 
unpriced emissions are the sole market failure, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program can achieve 
the first-best market allocation (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960), while renewable fuel mandates are 
strictly second-best (Helfand, 1992; Holland, Knittel and Hughes, 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 
2012; Lade and Lin Lawell, 2018).  This is because fuel mandates implicitly subsidize renewable 
fuels even if the renewable fuel still generates some emissions (Lade and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
Despite this, typically favor renewable fuel mandates over taxes and cap-and-trade programs to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from  transportation fuels.  
However, quantity-based mandates are susceptible to large increases in compliance costs, 
particularly in the presence of capacity or production constraints that are inherent in energy 
markets.  Given the experiences with the federal Renewable Fuel Standard in 2013, anticipating 
and designing climate policies in a way that can contain compliance costs is imperative (Lade, Lin 
Lawell and Smith, 2018).  In the case of renewable fuel mandates, since the marginal cost of 
renewable fuels is high relative to fossil fuels, cost containment mechanisms such as a credit 
window have the benefit of both constraining compliance costs and reducing deadweight loss.  In 
addition, when both a fuel mandate and cost containment mechanism are set optimally, the 
efficiency of fuel mandates can increase substantially over optimally setting fuel mandates alone 
(Lade and Lin Lawell, 2018).  Thus, if they are used instead of incentive-based instruments, 
quantity-based mandates such as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard, California’s Low Carbon 
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Fuel Standard, renewable portfolio standards, and the Clean Power Plan should be combined with 
a cost containment mechanism.    
Similarly, despite widespread agreement that a carbon tax would be more efficient, many 
countries use fuel economy standards to reduce transportation-related carbon dioxide emissions.  
However, fuel economy standards impose a constraint on automakers which creates an implicit 
subsidy for fuel-efficient vehicles and an implicit tax for fuel-inefficient vehicles (Davis and 
Knittel, 2016), and are susceptible to a potential rebound effect (Linn, 2016).  In addition, a 
corporate average fuel economcy standard that does not require that each vehicle model achieve a 
minimum fuel efficiency target, but instead allows firms to average across all the vehicle models 
that they produce, may impose additional compliance costs and a computational cost burden to 
firms of having to average across all the vehicle models they produce, and may be even less 
efficient than fuel economy standards that apply to each vehicle model (Chen and Lin Lawell, 
2018).   
License plate-based driving restrictions have been widely used as a method to reduce urban 
air pollution and traffic congestion in developing countries.  However, under certain 
circumstances, due to substitution, the purchase of a second car, the use of alternative modes of 
transportation, and/or atmospheric chemistry, it is possible for license plate-based driving 
restrictions to increase air pollution  (Zhang, Lin Lawell and Umanskaya, 2017). 
 The government has two potential roles in the surface transportation sector. The first 
potential role for government is to provide transportation infrastructure in the form of roads and 
public transit systems; and also to operate public transit services.  Once the infrastructure is in 
place, a second potential role for government is to employ policy instruments (such as taxes and 
other forms of regulation relating to safety, environmental standards, travel demand management 
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policies, and so forth) in order to address the market failures that are inherent to unregulated 
transportation activity; and also to determine the operational aspects of public transit service 
(Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2015; Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2018).  
While public transit receives plenty of political support for its “green” reputation and its 
contribution to sustainability, a contentious issue currently confronting transportation analysts and 
policy-makers is what the effects of public transit investment on congestion and on air quality are, 
and therefore what the appropriate level of public transit investment should be (Beaudoin and Lin 
Lawell, 2017; Beaudoin and Lin Lawell, 2018b).  
In the absence of a first-best Pigouvian congestion tax on auto travel, the second-best level 
of transit investment would account for the congestion-reduction effects of transit, and should be 
higher relative to that chosen when the congestion-reduction effects of transit are not accounted 
for, but the importance of this consideration is dependent upon the interaction of demand and cost 
interdependencies between the auto and transit modes, which may vary across regions (Beaudoin, 
Farzin and Lin Lawell, 2018).  For example, due to differences in cost interdependence and cross-
modal substitution, fixed guideway transit investments are expected to yield higher congestion-
reduction benefits than mixed transit modes in dense regions (Beaudoin, Farzin and Lin Lawell, 
2018).  Moreover, owing to the countervailing effects of substitution and induced demand, the 
effects of increases in public transit supply on auto travel depend on the time horizon (Beaudoin 
and Lin Lawell, 2018b). 
Although various economic and political constraints can preclude policy instruments that 
would in theory achieve a first-best outcome from being employed, policy-makers should use the 
first-best incentive- (or market-) based instruments as opposed to command and control policies 
whenever possible.  In addition, when constrained to use alternative policies, policy-makers should 
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strive to strive to increase their efficiency and implement second-best versions of these policies 
whenever possible.   
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